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Book Review 
Martin Ritter, Into the World: The Movement of 
Patočka’s Phenomenology (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 
2019) 
Phenomenological philosophy is characterized by its inherent openness 
in both a historic and systematic sense. Rather than a system, it is a perspective 
or an attitude for a radical approach to philosophizing. As Husserl’s own 
project remained unfinished, its openness for the history of philosophy is 
obvious. The movement he initiated shows openness of yet another nature. 
Already his closest direct disciples carried phenomenology further by 
rethinking the very idea of phenomenology itself. Amongst them without a 
doubt is also probably the most influental Czech philosopher of the twentieth 
century, Jan Patočka. His philosophy, based on a radical criticism and 
rethinking of transcendental phenomenology, is addressed in the book Into 
the World: The Movement of Patočka’s Phenomenology by Martin Ritter.  
Ritter claims to offer “a complete picture of the developments of 
Patočka’s phenomenology” (3). Yet his endeavour focuses not only on this 
task as a question of the history of philosophy. Ritter also offers an 
examination, rethinking and appropriation of Patočka’s philosophy for the 
immediate challenges of contemporary existence. 
Into the World consists of two intertwined parts. The first concisely 
introduces the diachronic logic of Patočka’s phenomenology. The second part 
focuses on the movement of existence that Ritter takes for the core concept of 
Patočka’s asubjecitve phenomenology, which he reinterprets to suit the 
requirements of a radical phenomenological analysis of our contemporary 
situation. 
Before—so to speak—diving into the text, let me linger on the surface, as 
the form of Ritter’s book tells a lot about the work he had done. Patočka’s 
philosophy is difficult indeed. Partially for the goals it seeks, partially for its 
recurrent examination of the same motifs with different accents as well as 
being scattered in multitude of texts accessible, as a whole, in different 
languages from which the original language is opened to understanding only 
to few. Patočka was a master in utilizing all the possibilities that Czech offers 
to articulate philosophical thoughts. The very language of Patočka’s texts is 
the source of certain levels of ambiguity, difficulties, and even obscurity of his 
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thinking. One cannot but duly appreciate that Ritter’s meticulous and 
systematic interpretation to a great degree diminishes this predicament, hence 
offering remarkable clarity to both Patočka’s and Ritter’s own arguments. 
Following Patočka  
Ritter starts his summary of Patočka’s phenomenology with his 
dissertation and habilitation, respectively, and then follows different stages of 
Patočka’s phenomenology chronologically up to the late phase of his 
asubjective phenomenology. From the very beginning of Patočka’s thought, 
Ritter follows his divergence from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology 
as inherently limited and in a way unjust to its own dictum: “back to things 
themselves.” Ritter suggests that Patočka sees the deficiency of the 
phenomenological method in Husserl’s transcendental idealism and the one-
sided subjectivism that phenomenology must overcome, because as it may be 
useful in evidence of how being is conditioned in its appearance, i.e., in 
epistemology, it is profoundly limited in how the world is, with all it consists 
of, conditioned in itself.  Thus, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is 
weak in answering ontological questions. Ritter follows developments of 
Patočka’s various concepts as well as other crucial philosophical influences in 
Patočka’s attempts to rethink and overcome Husserl’s transcendental 
subjectivism and to ground phenomenology ontologically. Besides the 
obvious influence of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, he keeps a particular 
focus on the Hegelian motif of history as well as the self-reflecting and self-
realizing motion of Spirit. This Hegelian motif along with the inspiration in 
Bergson is, in my reading of Ritter’s interpretation, particularly important for 
Patočka’s emphasis on life. 
Ritter charts Patočka’s divergence from Husserl on terms like 
intersubjectivity characterized as intermeshing monads; time as a general 
ontological fundament; life as a motion that decentralizes human being from 
one-sided subjectivity and thus—as a trans-individual center—overcomes 
subject-object dichotomy; inwardness of living “subject” that, being beyond 
subject-object differentiation, is a “kind of self-forming practice with world as 
its field” (36) and thus taking into play nonsubjective elements; the dialectic 
of spirit that precedes and necessitates the concept of Negative Platonism with 
its desubjectifying notion of Idea as No-Thing essentially identical with 
freedom that is the “experience we are” (54); corporeity conditioning being in 
decentralised situatedness in the midst of the world and of the life as a process 
where “I” becomes “I” through the encounter with That; and finally the 
movement of existence as the self-realization of existence that, as Ritter’s 
states, is the crucial concept for achieving asubjective phenomenology.  
At the end of part I, Ritter analyzes why Patočka never finished the 
concept of asubjecitve phenomenology and why, without a profound 
reconsideration, it might not have even been finishable. Yet still he sees and 
demonstrates Patočka’s attempt to achieve an asubjective phenomenology as 
J a k u b  V o t r o u b e k  |  1 9 5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIX, No 1-2 (2021)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2021.991 
decisive to making phenomenology as radical of a philosophical attitude as it 
proposed to be. Transcendental phenomenology was able to assess appearing 
as such. But to aptly access the ontological question of Being that is 
responsibly cared for, it is necessary—according to Ritter—to devise 
asubjective phenomenology or at least to radically desubjectify it. In other 
words, phenomenology needs to start from the inside and in the middle to 
appraise how human being and Being in general is conditioned. 
The general tendency of Ritter’s systematic interpretation of Patočka’s 
phenomenology may be described as understanding Patočka’s divergence 
from Husserl’s distanced, reflectively observing transcendental 
phenomenology towards an existential phenomenology that is grounded not 
only in ontology, but also in the positive responsibility of the human being to 
Being as a whole. In this manner Ritter shows how Patočka emancipates his 
phenomenology from Husserl and Heidegger alike. 
Here I am compelled to make a critical observation. Ritter claims that 
Patočka develops his phenomenology in a critical dialogue with Husserl and 
Heidegger. And this is indeed true. In the case of Heidegger, Ritter often refers 
to his texts either when pointing out similarities or differences. However, in 
the case of Husserl, Ritter refers to him—in his book otherwise filled with 
discussion with other authors—only in two instances. Once in the first part 
and once in the second. The reason for this approach is obvious. To confront 
Patočka with Husserl’s own positions would mean falling into a rabbit hole 
and losing the consistency of Ritter’s goal to offer a comprehensive 
interpretation of developments of Patočka’s phenomenology. This—so to 
speak—siding with Patočka is somewhat problematic but productive in the 
end. It keeps the book within its stated goal to offer comprehensive insight 
into Patočka’s phenomenology, and it still affords a very easily accessible 
point of departure for those, who would—and should—be interested in the 
adequacy of his critique towards Husserl.  
Beyond the Method 
“As a matter of fact, all the thinkers dealing with Patočka’s late 
phenomenology must not only interpret Patočka but think his concept 
through independently” (93). With these words at the end of part I, Ritter 
bridges to the second part in which he carries this out. He starts with the 
reevaluation of body, corporeity, and embodiment of existence in Patočka’s 
phenomenology. Ritter quite surprisingly calls for a specific reinstalment of a 
unified body-mind duality. The body is the bearer of the movement of 
existence and as such it is in the world. The “I” lives through the body but at 
the very same time, the body conditions the “I” by bestowing life upon it. 
Existence transcends the body by its acts of life but in this transcendence, it is 
ontologically torn apart, and in this way the body transcends existence. From 
this perspective of a body that is both inside the “I” and outside as something 
given, Ritter reinterprets Patočka’s concept of care for the soul.  
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For Ritter, care for the soul is inseparable from the movement of 
existence. Contrary to Patočka, Ritter does not emphasize only the third 
movement as the movement towards freedom that is the sole sphere where 
people can care for the soul in opposition to earthly bound movements of 
rootedness and work. For Ritter this sphere is rather the very existence itself 
as a movement that is autokinetic (self-moving) and autopoietic (self-creating) 
and is realized in one’s unity with oneself through all three movements. As 
such, existence is always situated within the given world with its given 
conditions and is fundamentally responsible for its own movement as it is 
responsibility for itself. It is due to the body’s rootedness in the earth that 
responsibility is a response to the given conditions of life within the unity of 
the world. Henceforth Ritter can claim in his interpretative development of 
Patočka’s phenomenology that: “The soul consists rather in the very ‘taking 
care’. It is possible only thanks to one’s responsivity to the world and it is 
performed when one assumes responsibility for one’s own responsive action, 
by appropriating it as one’s own” (126). 
This responsibility is, in Ritter’s development of Patočka, primarily an act 
of self-realization in response to others and otherness. Through encounters 
with them, the subject emerges as an “I” articulated within the conditions they 
give to it. How can phenomenology, in Ritter’s reinterpretation, make this 
conditioning visible? The obvious answer is in the intersubjective nature of 
existence. But, as Ritter clearly demonstrates, even in the first two movements 
intersubjectivity manifests itself not only in an immediate encounter, but also 
in the givenness of “institutions,” such as family in the first movement and 
symbolic institutions in the second movement.  
For phenomenology to be able to make these conditioning givens visible, 
and this is the genuine ambition of Ritter’s book, it is inevitable to step outside 
its own realm and adopt, or more precisely fuse with, non-phenomenological 
approaches. To obtain the notion of these conditionings within which the 
being self-realizes itself, it is, as Ritter argues, necessary to deepen 
phenomenology through media philosophy. He demonstrates it by his own 
specific concept of trans-subjectivity as a complement to intersubjectivity. 
Phenomenology, Ritter states, primarily considers intersubjectivity as an 
immediate encounter. It is to be added that at least the radical embrace of this 
face to face encounter in Levinas’ philosophy supports his notion. But (not 
only) in the contemporary world, as Ritter continues, intersubjective relations 
are vastly mediated by something nonsubjective, that is, by something that is 
at the center of the field of media philosophy.  
The potency of current (especially German) media philosophy leads 
Ritter to interpret “three movements [of existence] as three forms of mediality 
through which a singularly existing human being realizes its being” (134). 
This medialization of Patočka’s philosophy allows Ritter to enrich its scope 
by cultural techniques conceived as “objective-side” conditions 
unappreciated by phenomenology. As surprising as it might seem, I find this  
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plausible, especially when one considers the importance of techne or technê 
poietike for all the major inspirational sources of Patočka’s late 
phenomenology—especially for Plato, Aristotle, and Heidegger. This 
conditioning of existence by cultural techniques is not for Ritter in 
contradiction with Patočka’s focus on freedom as an essence of the human 
being. Freedom, for Ritter, is not imprisoned by these conditions. Existence is 
rather mediated and shaped in its free movement by itself to itself. Ritter’s 
thinking with Patočka beyond Patočka by fusing the asubjective (tendecy of) 
phenomenology with media philosophy allows him to overcome Patočka’s 
inherent Eurocentrism as well as to adapt his phenomenology to the 
contemporary world’s challenges. 
Ritter’s book is a remarkable contribution to interpretative studies of 
Patočka’s philosophy. Into the World offers a rigorous introduction to the 
developments of Patočka’s phenomenology that is, in Ritter’s interpretative 
enterprise, first and foremost an existential phenomenology. Yet this book 
offers much more than an introduction. It is an original and intriguing 
rethinking of Patočka that suggests—and takes —a radically new step in the 
development of phenomenology toward what could be described as a pathic 
phenomenology. 
Jakub Votroubek 
Charles University  
 
  
 
